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ORANGE IS FOREVER THE NEW BLACK: THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS QUASHED FOR MONTANA FELONS IN VAN DER 
HULE V. HOLDER 
 
Paige Griffith 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The State of Montana automatically restores felons’ gun rights 
once they complete their underlying sentences, so long as the crimes for 
which they were sentenced did not involve a dangerous weapon.1 
However, in Van der hule v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stripped those gun rights under federal statute.2  
 
II. A QUICK HISTORY OF FELON GUN CONTROL 
 
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,”3 but the 
government has had “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons[.]”4 Prior to the 1980s, few felons were able to reclaim 
their Second Amendment gun rights upon serving their sentence. Title IV 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Crime 
Control Act) provides that: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person— 
 
(1) who has been convicted . . . of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year; 
. . .  
to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any 
firearm or ammunition[.]5 
 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act 
(FOPA), which allowed states to restore felons’ civil rights. Yet, FOPA 
would trump state law under certain circumstances. FOPA amended Title 
IV of the Crime Control Act to define “a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”:  
 
                                         
1
 Throughout this short note, the term “felon” is used as an indication of status. All discussion of 
“felons” refers to felons released from custody. 
2
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). 
3
 U.S. Const. amend. II. 
4
 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008). 
5
 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
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What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be 
determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in 
which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has 
been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been 
pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be 
considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless 
such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that 
the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms.6  
 
Therefore, if any state statute triggers the “unless clause” of Title IV, 
federal statute preempts state law and felons of that state are not allowed 
to possess or purchase firearms.  
In Montana, the State restores felons’ gun rights once they have 
served their sentences: 
 
[I]f a person has been deprived of a civil or constitutional 
right by reason of conviction for an offense and the person’s 
sentence has expired or the person has been pardoned, the 
person is restored to all civil rights and full citizenship, the 
same as if the conviction had not occurred.7 
 
Montana’s re-instatement of these rights is constitutionally and 
statutorily based.8 
 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1983, Frank Van der hule was convicted of sexual assault and 
four counts of sexual intercourse without consent. 9 He was sentenced to 
25 years imprisonment.10 In 1993, Van der hule was paroled, and in 1999 
he received a “Final Discharge” notice stating his civil rights were 
restored.11 In 2003, Van der hule attempted to purchase a firearm from a 
firearms dealer in Montana.12 The dealer refused sale to Van der hule 
after searching through the National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System (NCIS) and concluding that under federal law, Van der hule was 
precluded from receiving a Montana concealed weapons permit and 
purchasing or possessing any firearms.13 Van der hule filed suit for 
                                         
6
 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added). 
7
 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–801(2). 
8
 Id.; Mont. Const. art. II, § 28(2) (“Full rights are restored by termination of state supervision for 
any offense against the state.”). 
9
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045; Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–502(1), (3); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 45–5–503(1), (3). Under Montana law, both crimes are felonies punishable by imprisonment of not 
less than four years. 
10
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045. 
11
 Van der hule v. Mukasey, 217 P.3d 1019, 1019 (Mont. 2009). 
12
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045. 
13
 Id. 
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declaratory judgment under 18 U.S.C. § 925A, asking the Attorney 
General to approve his firearm purchase.14 In September 2007, the 
district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, but 
certified a question to the Montana Supreme Court.15 The district court 
“asked whether, under Montana law . . . a sheriff has the discretion to 
grant a concealed weapons permit to someone with a criminal history 
similar to Van der hule’s.”16 The Montana Supreme Court accepted the 
certified question on October 10, 2007.17 More than a year later, in 
January 2009, the Montana Supreme Court answered that no felon was 
permitted to have a concealed weapons permit.18  
Subsequently, Van der hule amended his complaint and argued 
that “federal and state law depriving him of his right to purchase a 
firearm violate[d] the Second Amendment.”19 The parties filed cross 
motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted the 
government’s motion on the Second Amendment issue.20 The court held 
that “Van der hule was prohibited by federal law from possessing or 
receiving a firearm by virtue of his restriction on obtaining a Montana 
concealed weapons permit and that Van der hule, by virtue of his prior 
felony conviction, had no federal constitutional right to possess a 
firearm.”21 Van der hule appealed.22 
 
IV. MAJORITY OPINION 
 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals majority upheld the U.S. 
District Court decision. Under Montana law, a local sheriff “shall issue” 
a concealed weapons permit unless the applicant was convicted of a 
felony. The statute describing the permit describes that this: 
 
privilege may not be denied an applicant unless the 
applicant . . .  
 
has been convicted in any state or federal court of: 
 
(i) a crime punishable by more than 1 year of 
incarceration; or 
                                         
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Van der hule v. Mukasey, 217 P.3d at 1020. 
18
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045 (citing Van der hule v. Mukasey, 217 P.3d 1019). 
19
 Id.  
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. at 1045–1046. 
22
 Id. at 1046. 
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(ii) regardless of the sentence that may be imposed, a 
crime that includes as an element of the crime an act, 
attempted act, or threat of intentional homicide, 
serious bodily harm, unlawful restraint, sexual 
abuse, or sexual intercourse or contact without 
consent.23 
 
The majority opined that this Montana law restricting felons from 
obtaining a concealed weapons permit was enough of a restriction on the 
right to possess firearms to trigger the “unless clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 
921(a)(20).24 
 The court used Caron v. United States to assess how the “unless 
clause” is activated.25 In Caron, a Massachusetts felon served his time 
and was restored his civil rights pursuant to Massachusetts law.26 
However, Caron was unable to obtain a license to carry because of his 
felony record.27 After his unsuccessful attempt to get a valid permit, 
Caron was convicted of carrying a rifle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922.28 
He appealed the conviction pursuant to his state’s civil right restoration 
statute.29 The First Circuit concluded that the inability to obtain a 
Massachusetts license to carry was sufficient to trigger the “unless 
clause” and bar him from possessing any firearms under federal law.30 
Caron appealed, and the United States Supreme Court held that the 
phrase “may not . . . possess . . . firearms” in § 922(g) must be 
interpreted under an “all-or-nothing” approach.31 The Supreme Court 
determined that the legislative intent was “to keep guns away from all 
offenders who, the Federal Government feared, might cause harm, even 
if those persons were not deemed dangerous by States.”32 
 The Ninth Circuit found Van der hule’s case almost identical to 
Caron. The only difference was Massachusetts permitted felons to own 
firearms, including rifles, shotguns, and handguns, but they could not 
carry the handguns outside of their home or business, while Montana 
allowed felons to carry firearms, but restricted them from obtaining a 
permit to carry concealed handguns.33 Montana’s scheme was less 
restrictive than Massachusetts’s.34 Thus, Montana did not restrict what 
                                         
23
 Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–321(1)(c)(i–ii) (emphasis added). 
24
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1051. 
25
 Id. at 1048 (citing Caron v. U.S., 524 U.S. 308 (1998)). 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1048. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. at 1049. 
34
 Id. 
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firearms a prior felon could carry, but did limit the way in which a felon 
can possess firearms.35  
 The court further held that although the word “possession” was 
ambiguous, the U.S. Supreme Court defined possession of a firearm as 
“the power to control and the intent to control.”36 Because Montana 
limited the way felons could carry a handgun, the limitation was 
sufficient under the Supreme Court’s definition of “possession” since it 
regulated a felon’s power to control and intent to control his or her 
firearms. For the court, this constraint was sufficient to trigger the 
“unless clause.”37 Further, the court found Van der hule’s Second 
Amendment argument unsubstantiated. The Ninth Circuit had already 
concluded § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment.38  
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
The Ninth Circuit improperly held that § 921(a)(20)’s “unless 
clause” was triggered by Montana’s concealed weapons statute. The 
court stretched the federal statute too far by concluding that once a state 
deems a felon too dangerous to be able obtain a concealed weapons 
permit, then all felons are too dangerous to possess firearms in any 
context. The court quickly dismissed Van der hule’s argument that the 
phrasing “may not . . . possess” did not reach to concealment as a matter 
of possession.39 Through a textual reading of the Montana statute, the 
legislature, very explicitly, did not restrict re-instatement of felon gun 
rights. Quite the opposite, the statute reads: “the person is restored to all 
civil rights and full citizenship, the same as if the conviction had not 
occurred.”40 Montana wanted felons, who have properly served their 
sentences, to live again as citizens of the State.  
Understandably, the concern in America is whether a violent 
felon should be classified differently than a less violent felon. In Britt v. 
North Carolina41, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled in favor of a 
particular felon’s right to possess firearms.42 After this 2009 decision, a 
wave of confusion ensued: Did this court decision extend to other felons? 
                                         
35
 Id. (emphasis in original). 
36
 Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1049 (citing United States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1310 
(9th Cir. 1979)). 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. at 1050–1051 (citing United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
39
 Id. 
40
 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–801(2). 
41
 Britt v. North Carolina, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009). 
42
 Deborah Bone, Comment: The Heller Promise Versus the Heller Reality: Will Statutes Prohibiting 
the Possession of Firearms by Ex-felons be Upheld After Britt v. State?, 100 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 1633, 1639–1640 (2010) (citing Britt, 681 S.E.2d 320 (holding that that a state statute 
prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons could not reasonably be applied to a felon 
who had an uncontested record of lifelong nonviolence, thirty years of law-abiding conduct since his 
crime, and seventeen years of responsible, lawful firearm possession before the statute was enacted). 
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What type of felons were allowed re-instatement of their gun rights? 
Should other states follow suit?43 Clearly, to consider the felon’s history 
of “responsible, lawful firearm possession” and consider some “absence 
of lawlessness and dangerousness” for each individual felon is tedious.44 
Yet, the Britt majority believed citizens’ “right to keep and bear arms” is 
fundamental and did not want to paint all felons with the same brush. 
Since Mr. Britt was convicted of a non-violent crime, had a long history 
of lawfulness, and had always safely possessed firearms, the Court did 
not see him as a threat to public safety and allowed him to possess 
firearms.45  
The Britt dissent found a prohibition on felon gun rights 
reasonable because “one who has committed a felony has displayed a 
degree of lawlessness that makes it entirely reasonably for the 
legislature, concerned for the safety of the public it represents, to want to 
keep firearms out of the hands of such a person.”46 The Ninth Circuit 
agreed. Rather than try to decipher whether a particular felon was able to 
possess firearms or obtain a concealed weapons permit, the federal 
judiciary wrongly laid a blanket ban over all Montana felons’ gun rights. 
While the Britt decision had no direct effect on federal law, it 
should have persuaded other states to follow suit. This is especially true 
for Montana—a strong pro-gun state. Even though the process of 
determining individual felons’ worthiness to possess firearms may be 
grueling, it is well worth it to uphold our state’s constitutional right to 
bear arms.  
Moreover, Van der hule is flawed because the Ninth Circuit 
analyzed Montana law to fall within the “unless clause.” If the court had 
decided Montana’s limitation on felons’ ability to carry a concealed 
weapon did not reach “possession” of firearms as a matter of law, there 
would be no preemption issue. When states, like Montana, explicitly 
codify felons’ civil right re-instatement, a minor state regulation on the 
way felons can carry firearms should not result in a comprehensive 
prohibition on all firearm possession. As such, the court should have 
interpreted the “unless clause” more narrowly, so no conflict between 
Montana law and federal law existed. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
After this Ninth Circuit decision, Montana felons who wish to 
possess guns will never be able to. If other states take on Van der hule’s 
approach, the “unless clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) will continue to 
eat away at state re-instatement of felons’ civil rights.  
                                         
43
 Id. at 1642. 
44
 Id.  
45
 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 323. 
46
 Id. at 324 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting). 
